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PRESENT DAY LABOR LITIGATION*
The recent cases of Reardon v. Caton (1919) 189 App. Div. 501,
178 N. Y. Supp. M and Buyer v. Guillan' (I92o, U. S. D. C., S. D.
N. Y.) 63 N. Y. L. J. 1625, with the interesting questions of law and
economics involved therein, serve as excellent samples of the progress
of the law as it meets each new problem and either aids or temporarily
retards its solution. Certainly the two cases invite attention to the
present status of labor litigation and an inquiry as to whether the
courts are finding the true remedy for our economic disturbances.
The questions involved in the two cases are practically identical and
have their origin in the same state of facts. The defendant unions,
composed of freight handlers, checkers, weighers, etc., on the steam-
ship piers in New York City, refused to handle any freight not brought
there by union truck drivers. A trucking company and individual
*[This comment is the. first of a series on this vitally important subject. The
first installment is a classification of the cases.-Ed.]
[280]
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shippers applied for an injunction to prevent this discrimination, but
in each instance the injunction was denied and the acts of the union
upheld.1
As a result of these two decisions, the shipping facilities of the
greatest port in the United States were virtually placed under the con-
trol of trade unions. Not only must the dock workers be union men,
but also the persons engaged in transporting the goods to the docks.
This rule might logically be extended to the manufacture of goods as
well. The forces opposed to such unionization, after the cases were
decided against them, received considerable newspaper publicity about
their steps to organize independent and non-union transportation and
shipping facilities. It was a typical industrial conflict. Even a brief
survey of the extensive labor litigation of this character existing at
the present time, indicates that the courts are occupying a more prom-
inent part in our. economic and political life than at any time since the
slavery cases preceding the Civil War. And while much criticism is
naturally levelled at their decisions, yet they have to meet squarely
these problems of economic growth. It is to them that we must look
for the establishment of sound principles that will direct us to econ-
omic peace and justice; particularly since the legislatures are should-
ering but a small part of the burden.
The decisions of the various courts seem at times to be in hopeless
conflict as they struggle with this question. But there are certain
definite principles gradually being evolved, about which the decisions
group themselves. In order to analyse existing cases and to reach a
basis for the discussion of any labor litigation, it is elementary that one
'These decisions are in accord with the leading New York cases on this
subject. Nat'l Protective Ass. v. Cumming (i9o2) iTo N. Y. 3X5, 63 N. E. 369;
Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal (1917)244 U. S. 459, 37 Sup. Ct. 718 (recognizing
Nat'l Protective Ass. v. Cumming as the established New York rule); Bossert v.
Dhuy (i917) 2zi N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (which approves statement in Paine
Lumber Co. v. Neal). It is necessary to distinguish these cases from those in
which force or coercion is directed against third -parties. See Auburn Draying
Co. v. Wardell (igig) 227 N. Y. I, 124 N. E. 97, where the court says, "It was
not simply that the members refused to be employed by the plaintiff or its
patrons, unless and until it employed members of the union. The unions ...
induced employers of labor . . . and the people generally . . . to abstain from
business transactions with the plaintiff.., by causing loss ... or fear of loss ...
to their business. .. . They sought to compel and did compel those employers
and the people to coerce the plaintiff to unionize its business." And in Michaels
v. Hillman (i92o, Sup. Ct.) 112 Misc. 395, 183 N. Y. Supp. I95, it is said that
"If no threats, intimidation, force, violence, or other coercive measures were
employed, the defendants are not liable, for they were within their rights in
seeking to compel recognition by calling a strike."
Contra to the principal case of Reardon v. Caton, and criticised in Buyer v.
Guillan, supra, is the recent case of Burgess Bros. Co. v. Stewart (ig2o, Sup. Ct.)
112 Misc. 347, i84 N. Y. Supp. i99, although the court there tried to distinguish
its view.
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must first determine what rights are involved and then what consti-
tutes a violation of those rights. The decisions are not always clear
as to just what primary rights are involved in the question under dis-
cussion, but it is believed that by a proper analysis those which pro-
tect the employer can be grouped under two heads: (i) rights against
interference with existing contractual relations; and (2) the right to a
free market of both labor and goods.2 The employee, on the other hand,
originally had almost no privileges except that he, as an individual,
might stop work when he so desired. Concerted action was a viola-
tion of the then existing rules of law.3 Public opinion, however, grad-
ually brought about a change, so that trade unionism was recognized
as a lawful feature of our economic structure. The result was that
as employees became legally privileged to organize and to act col-
lectively by agreement, the previously existing legal rights of the em-
'The two are closely allied. In (2) the courts insist that the employer
shall be privileged to deal with -others and to Ido so unhampered and without
compulsion of any kind, while in (i) they hold that the performance of this
contract, once made, is to ;be free from the same interference. These doctrines
are merely an expression of the prima facie tort idea. In general any person
whose interference with the employer's dealings with another person, in any way
other than by mere persuasion, causes harm, has committed a prima facie tort
against both parties. And the same thing is true of interference with the
performance of a contract, the only reason for drawing a distinction between
the two being the fact that the courts are more willing to justify an interference
under (2) than under (i). This may be due to the fact that the right that third
persons should not interfere with existing contractual relations was recognized
in our law at a much earlier period than the right that they should not prevent
the consummation of inchoate contracts. The division thus seems to be one
of degree and precedent rather than of fundamental principles.
That these are recognised as rights, see O'Brien v. People (I905) 216 I0. 354,
75 N. E. io8, where it is stated that "The law is well settled that every person
shall be protected in the right to enter into contracts or in refusing to do so . . .
without interference by others. No person or combination of persons can
legally, by direct or indirect means, obstruct or interfere with another in the
conduct of his lawful business, and any attempt to compel an individual, firm, or
corporation to execute an agreement to conduct his or its business . . . by a
particular class of employees is not only unlawful and actionable, but is an
interference with the exercise of the highest civil right." This was followed in
Barnes v. Typographical Union (I908) 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940 (where the
dissenting opinion was inclined to hold it a prima facie tort justified, saying,
"Changing conditions in the industrial world constantly require us to make
applications of existing laws to situations not before contemplated"). See also
7 Labatt, blaster & Servant (1913) 8171, 8326; Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor
Litigation (907) 2o HARV. L. REv. 261; Cooke, Combinations, Monopolies,
Labor Unions (2d ed. 19o9) 58; W. W. Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions (1918)
27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 779, note 53.
'The earliest reported case on this subject is The Tubwomen v. The Brewers
of London, cited in King v. Journeymen-Taylors (1721, K. B.) 8 Mod. lo. For
an excellent discussion of the growth of this rule see Parrington, The Tubwomen
v. The Brewers of London (903) 3 COL. L. REv. 447. This rule was adopted in
only two states, New York and Pennsylvania, and it was soon abandoned.
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ployers were correspondingly negatived and reduced. We thus find a
growing clash of interests. As soon as society permits the employees
to call a strike or to threaten to call one, we have a prima facie tort, for
such action must necessarily involve interference with the employer's
rights. Conceding that these must be modified to some extent, how
far shall we hold the acts of the union privileged? The only standard
is public policy, and that must determine the rights and privileges to be
accorded to either party. It is in the settlement of this point that the
courts experience great difficulty and are in conflict. They even now
seem to grope in an effort to determine just what should be embraced in
the concept "justifiable trade competition," and to realize to some
extent their opportunity and obligation of evolving sound social laws
to guide us in our industrial growth.
In deciding that a given strike is wrongful, the courts have as-
signed various reasons, which may be roughly grouped. The wrong
lies: either in the fact of combination itself ;4 or in the unjustifiable
object of the combination; or in the means employed. This division
forms the basis for discussion in these comments. The first group is
no longer important; the second involves many conflicting decisions
which we may now seek to classify; the third is comparatively easy of
solution, and will be discussed in a later comment.
Where the court holds that the object of the combination is unlawful,
it is meant of course that the object sought to be accomplished by the
strike is not justifiable as trade competition 5 and so does not make
lawful the prima facie tort. This matter of justification is somewhat
' This rule is only of historical interest and serveT to explain many of the early
decisions. That the combination is illegal per se has not been recognized in any
of the later cases, although the view has its supporters among those who believe
that there should be a tort of conspiracy as well as such a crime. Mr. Justice
Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896) 167 Mass. 92,
44 N. E. io77, says, "But there is a notion which latterly has been insisted on a
good deal, that a combination of persons to do what any one of them lawfully
might do by himself will make the otherwise lawful conduct unlawful. It would
be rash to say that some as yet unformulated truth may not be hidden under this
proposition. But in the general form in which it has been presented and accepted
by many courts, I think it plainly untrue, both on authority and principle."
See also Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Local (1905)
165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877; i B. R. C. 246, note; (Ig2o) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 809.
"Trade Competition" is here used in its broadest sense. It is submitted that
this expression should be used to designate the struggle between employees.
themselves, such as a conflict between two unions, or a union and non-union
employees, since these are really in trade competition each with the other. It
seems to be misleading as applied to the situation wherein the employee is not
striving to' displace someone, as in a strike for better working conditions, for
example. This distinction is recognized by Mr. Justice Holmes in Vegelahn v.
Guntner, supra note 4, where he suggests that a general term to cover this
situation might be, free struggle for life."
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confused, not only because the courts differ on the proper test of justi-
fication, but also because at times they declare a strike illegal because
of the methods of prosecuting it, when actually they mean that
the act is not justifiable as trade competition. This is particularly
true in cases involving secondary strikes and boycotts. Consequently
we must sometimes look to the final result of the decision rather than
to the reasons given to support it.
In developing the question as to what constitutes a justification it
seems best to take up and discuss separately each natural division of
labor disputes, disregarding temporarily any situations in which con-
tract rights are involved.
A. The primary situation is that in which the employees go on
strike against their employer Y to obtain shorter hours, higher wages,
or better working conditions in general.6 It is to be noticed that there
are here but two parties involved, and the general rule seems to be that
the employees may strike for any reason whatsoever, or indeed for no
reason at all.7
B. The next situation is that in which the employees strike against
Y to compel him to discharge Z, a fellow employee. There is here a
triangular dispute with three sets of rights and duties involved.8  The
employees usually have one of two purposes: (i) They may seek to
secure a competent fellow employee. This is generally considered to
be a justifiable purpose.9 (2) They may attempt to compel Z to join
'No distinction will be drawn between a strike and a threat to strike, for in
the writer's opinion the legal effect is the same. See Parker, C. J., in Nat'l
Protective Ass. v. Cumming, supra note i.. This question becomes of importance
chiefly in secondary strikes and boycotts, and it is submitted that if there is any
difference whatsoever, it is coercion of a stronger kind actually to stop work for
A until he ceases to deal with B, than it is merely to threaten to do so. The
word "strike" in this discussion is taken to mean the concerted refusal to work
until certain conditions are performed, and not simply a cessation of work with
no intention of resuming.
'There is very little authority for holding such a strike unlawful. It may
at one time have been a prima facie tort against Y to strike in order to compel
him to conduct his business as the employees* directed; yet the rule seems to
have been honored in the breach rather than in the observance, and so the act
is not even considered a prima facie tort requiring justification; it is no tort
at all. Usually, of course, a primary strike of this kind involves some dispute
as to employment, and so the decisions, "playing safe," call it a justifiable strike.
See Wabash Ry. v. Hannahan (1903, C. C. E. D. Mo.) 121 Fed. 563.
8 This is still a dispute as to terms of employment between Y and his employees,
and the great weight of authority holds that there is a justification of the prima
facie tort against Y. The relation between the employees and Z is discussed
below.
"'Many decisions, and perhaps the weight of authority, uphold the right of
employees, either individually or hi combination, to quit working because some
fellow servant is obnoxious to them . ... This is on the principle that
employees may choose both their employer and their working associates."
Carter v. Oster (Igog) 134 Mo. App. x46, 112 S. W. 995; accord, Clemmitt v.
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a union. This then becomes the question of the dosed shop. Some
courts hold that the injury to Z is justifiable, while others are squarely
opposed to this view.10 But where such a closed shop policy involves a
monopoly of the entire trade, making it necessary that Z take up a new
trade or seek employment elsewhere, the courts are more hesitant and
appear to be pretty evenly divided as to whether this is lawful or not.
1
Watson (I895) 14 Ind. App. 38, 42 N. E. 367; Nat'l Protective Ass. v. Cumming,
supra note i; Berry v. Donovan (i9o5) 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. F. 603. There
is, of course, a violation of Z's prima facie right not to be prevented from dealing
with Y; but any legitimate reason of the employees will justify this prima
facie tort. Where the employees act on mere personal dislike, not founded on
good cause, the tort is not justified. De Minico v. Craig (191i) 2o7 Mass. 593,
94 N. E. 317; Bausbach v. Reiff (914) 244 Pa. 559, 9i AtI. 224.
"
0Here again the prima facie tort against Y is generally considered to be
justified, for the unions are still engaged in a primary dispute as to terms of
employment. And indeed as against Z, also, the great weight of authority is to
the effect that the strike is legally justifiable. Pickett v. Walsh (1906) 192 Mass.
572, 78 N. E. 753 (where unions even refused to take Z into membership, because
they limited the number of their members) ; Mills v. United States Printing Co.
(igo4) 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. Supp. i85, affirmed in (igio) igg N. Y. 76,
92 N. E. 214. Contra, Erdman v. Mitchell (i9O3) 207 Pa. 79, 56 At. 327 (held
to be contrary to spirit of Bill of Rights).
There are but few courts that hold a strike for a dosed shop to be unjusti-
fiable. O'Brien v. People, supra note 2; Barnes & Co. v. Berry (1907, C. C_
S. D. Ohio), i56 Fed. 72 (which states that a closed shop is against public
policy); Barnes v. Typographical Union, supra note 2. The cases of O'Brien v.
People and Barnes v. Typographical Union are distinguished in Kemp v. Division
No. 241 (912) 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389, where it was held that a strike to have
a non-union workman discharged was lawful. In Smith v. Bowen (iQ99) 232
Mass. io6, 121 N. E. 814, it was held that a strike for a closed shop was illegal,
but not where it was to enforce an agreement to maintain a closed shop. Of
like effect is Shinsky v. O'Neil (1919) 232 MasS. 99, 121 N. E. 79o (which also
approves of collective bargaining); and see (i919) 28 YALS LAw JOURNAL, 6iI.
11The reasons against such a monopoly are stated by Prentice, C. J. in Connors
V. Conolly (1913) 86 Conn. 641, 86 At. 6oo: the "tendency [of monopoly] is to
expose him [Z] to the tyranny of the will of others, and to bring about a
monopoly which will exclude what he has to dispose of, and other people need,
from the open market, or perhaps from any market. . . . They [monopolies]
are especially intolerable where they concern the basic resource of individual
existence, to wit, the capacity to labor." Probably the leading case for those
who hold such a monopoly unjustifiable is the one often cited, Berry v. Donovan,
supra note 9. This decision, too, is based on the idea that "A monopoly,
controlling anything which the world must have, is fatal to prosperity and
progress. . . . The attempt to force all laborers to combine in unions
is against the policy of the law, because it aims at monopoly." It is to
be noticed that the principle of the closed shop is not disapproved by the Con-
necticut courts, except when it causes a virtual monopoly. Cohn & Roth
Electric Co. v. Bricklayers' Local (I917) 92 Conn. 16I, ioi AtI. 659. For the
contrary view see Nat'l Protective Ass. v. Cumming, supra note I.
Where the dispute is between two unions, that is, union A strikes if union B
is given any work, the courts seem to regard it as in no wise different from a
strike against non-union men. Competition of this kind between combinations
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A situation closely allied to these cases arises when X, a union or-
ganizer, tries to unionize Y's shop. Usually X is enjoined because of
the means used (picketing, threats, etc.), but the majority of courts also
hold that his interference is. unjustifiable 1 2
C. The class of cases most before the courts at the present time
seems to be that involving four or more parties: that is, when employ-
ees strike against Y to compel him to refuse to deal with W, an em-
ployer of non-union labor. These cases are perhaps the most interest-
ing, and have the most divergent results of any in the field of labor
litigation. They generally arise in either of two ways. (i) The
employees of Y refuse to work with employees (non-union) of W,
both engaged on different work but engaged on the same general task.
The weight of later authority seems to support the employees of Y.11
This also applies to that situation in which W is a sub-contractor and
puts in his work either before or after Y.U (2) The employees of Y
refuse to handle goods manufactured by W (non-union employer).
of men, carried on for purpose of gain, is not actionable unless there is malice.
Nat'l Protective Ass. v. Cumming, supra note i; Pickett v. Walsh, supra note Io;
Erdman v. Mitchell, supra note zo.
'Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass. (19o7) 72 N. J. Eq. 653, 66 At.
953, affirmed in (I911) 77 N. J. Eq. 219, 79 Atl. 262; Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell (1917) 245 U. S. =9, 38 Sup. Ct. 65; Eagle Glass Mfg. Co. v.
Rowe (1917) 245 U. S. 275, 38 Sup. Ct. 8o; Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine
Operators' Union (1918) i4o Minn. 48r, 168 N. W. 766 (to prevent plaintiff from
operating machine himself); Stuyvesant Lunch & Bakery Corp. v. Reimer
(i92o, Sup. Ct.) iio Misc. Rep. 357, 181 N. Y. Supp. 212. Contra, Steffes v.
Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union (917) 136 Minn. 2oo, 163i N. W. 524;
Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke (1917) 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. io7; Diamond Block
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers (Igao, Ky.) 2= S. W. io79; Michaels v.
Hillman, supra note i. It is suggested that this is, after all, but an extension
of the closed shop idea discussed in the preceding note, except that here the
organization is from the outside instead of originating with the employees.
If carried to its logical conclusion the result would be one united labor world.
A peculiar situation, akin to this last, arises whete the unions attempt to
compel an employer to unionize his shop and also seek to dictate the number
of men to be employed. This case has arisen in regard to theatre orchestras and
has been decided both ways. Haverhill Strand Theatre v. Gillen (1918) 229
Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671 (unions enjoined); Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v.
Minneapolis Musicians' Ass. (1912) 118 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. IO92 (unions
upheld); see (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOUiRNAL, 1088.
"It is to be noted that the unions here leave the realm of direct benefits
(wages, hours, etc.), and their only justification can be the-strengthening of the
union ranks as a whole. The following decisions have upheld the unions in
such a case. Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Brick-layers Local, supra note Ii;
Gray v. Building Trades Council (19o3) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663 (provided
union does not threaten others). See also cases, supra note io. Contra, Snow
Iron Works v. Chadwick (1917) 227 Mass. 382, 116 N. E. 8oi.
"'Nat'l Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Ass. (9o9, C. C. A. 2d) I69 Fed.
259; Gray V. Building Trades Council, supra note 13; Meier v. Speer (19io) 96
Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988.
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The authorties are very much in conflict on this point, the present
tendency possibly being to uphold the employees of Y11 as is evidenced
in the two principal cases. This situation is ordinarily called a boy-
cott, but is to be distinguished from the so-called secondary boycott.1 6
PROVISIONS FOR FORFEITURE OUTSID THE INSURANCE POLICY
The extreme lengths to which the courts will go in order to hold an
insurance company bound is well exemplified in the recent case of
Southland Life Insurance Co. v. Hopkins (I92O, Tex. Civ. App.) 2I9
S. W. 254. This was a suit upon an insurance policy which gave 31
days without interest as a period of grace for the payment of pre-
miums. A statute required a month's period of grace, with interest.
The insured gave an eight months note, without grace, with interest, for
a premium, the note providing that if it were not paid at maturity the
"policy shall be void, subject to the provisions therein contained."
Nine days before the note was due, the company wrote the insured,
warning him that the-policy would lapse if the note were not paid, but
offering to accept a partial payment and to extend the balance. The
insured died one day after the note was due, not having paid it. The
'Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council (i9o8) 154 Calif. 58r, 98 Pac. io27;
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering (igi8, C. C. A. nd) 252 Fed. 72z (based o
Clayton Act); Meier v. Speer, supra note I4; Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v.
Mather (igo7) 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 59o (first Florida case involving a labor
dispute); Reardon v. Caton
, 
supra; State v. Employers of Labor (1918) im21
Neb. 768, 169 N. W. 717; Sheehan v. Levy (i919, Tex.) 215 S. W. 229; Stath v.
Van Pelt (i9o4) 136 N. C. 633,49 S. E. I77 (held not to be a criminal conspiracy);
Bossert v. Dhuy, vupra note I; discussed in Commnnrs (i918) 27 YALE L W
JOuRNAL, 539.
It will be found that in most of the cases opposed to this view there is the
presence of a fifth party, such as a labor leader, who is in a position to dictate
to the employees of Y. Booth & Bro. v. Burgess (i9o6) 72 N. J. Eq. I8i, 65
Atl. 226; Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass., supra note 12. Ofttimes,
too, the threatening of the customers of W causes the courts to take unfavorable
action when it is quite likely that a mere abstention from handling non-union
material would not be enjoined. See dissenting opinion of Cornish, J., in State
v. Employers of Labor, supra note 15; Burnham v. Dowd (914) 217 Mass. 351,
1o4 N. E. 841.
"This distinction is clearly brought out by Justice A. N. Hand in the principal
case of Buyer v. Guillan, supra. "In that case [Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell,
supra note I] the labor unions used their influence to have the patronage with-
drawn from the non-union shop. Dealers, ice deliverers, bakers, butchers,
builders, plumbers, and contractors, because of the notices, warnings, and
declarations of the defendant, discontinued business with the plaintiff. In other
words, there was a secondary boycott in the Auburn Draying Company case
which embraced far more than in the case at bar or in the case of Bossert v.
Dhuy [supra note I]. Here the acts of the defendants were limited to boy-
cotting goods that came to the pier where they were working and were the
subject-matter upon which their labor was to be expended."
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court allowed a recovery by the plaintiff, J. Boyce dissenting in a
strong opinion.
There has been some difference of opinion in the courts as to the
effect of a provision for forfeiture in a note given for the premium,
where there was no such stipulation in the policy itself. It has been
held that such a condition in the note is without effect, in the absence
of a stipulation in the policy.' Other courts reach the result that such
a provision merely creates a condition subsequent, of which the com-
pany must avail itself by clear and unequivocal acts, such as demanding
payment at maturity and declaring a forfeiture if payment is not
made.2 The orthodox view, however, is that such a provision in the
note should have the same effect as if it were contained in the policy
also.8 It would seem that this is the just result, and that the insured
should not be allowed the advantage of an extension of time without the
corresponding burden of forfeiture. In the instant case, therefore, the
company should not be held to have waived the forfeiture by its silence
on the day the note was due.4  The letter written to the insured cannot
be made the basis of an estoppel, as it clearly warned the insured of the
threatened lapse of the policy, and the insured, being delirious with the
influenza, could in no way have relied upon it.
It has long been discussed in the law of insurance whether, in the
absence of an estoppel, there can be a waiver of a forfeiture without
new consideration. This would seem to depend on the question
whether a policy on which a forfeiture has been incurred is void
or voidable. In spite of the frequent use of such terms as "void"
and "of no effect," the intention of the parties would appear to be that
such a clause merely makes the policy voidable, that is, gives the com-
pany power to avoid it, but has no further operation. This is the
usual interpretation of sucha provision to the lay mind. Mr. Ewart,
in his article on Waiver in Insurance,5 assumes that such a policy is
voidable only, in working out his principle of "election." The modem
tendency is certainly toward such an interpretation. 6 If such a con-
'Dwelling-House Ins. Co. v. Hardie (887) 37 Kan. 674, 16 Pac. 92.
'Rissler v. Fidelity Mutual Ins. Co. (19o3) 11o Tenn. 411, 75 S. W. 735.
'Frank v. Sun Life Assurance Co. (1892) 2o Ont. App. 564. See Vance,
Insurance (19o4) 237: "It can make no possible difference in legal contemplation
whether the condition avoiding the policy for non-payment of the note is written
on the face of the policy, or on the face of the note, or on a premium receipt, or
in any other properly executed instrument It is equally a part of the contract,
and should be enforced as made. If the insured has signed, and the insurer has
received, a premium note in which it is stipulated that if it shall not be paid at
maturity, the policy is to.be null and void, a failure to pay operates of itself to
avoid the contract, and the mere fact that the insurer may waive the forfeiture if
he sees fit, does not affect the case."
'Benholzer v. New York Life Ins. Co. (x898) 74 Minn. 387, 77 N. W. 295;
Underwood v. Security Life and Annuity Co. (917) lo8 Tex. 381, 194 S. W. 585.
"(i9o5) 18 HAav. L. REv. 364.
'Kingman v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (1899) 54 S. C. 599, 32 S. E. 762; Lantz v.
Vermont Life Ins. Co. (i8gi) 139 Pa. 546, 21 Atl. 8o.
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tract is held to be voidable at the option of the company, there is, in
legal theory, no necessity for consideration in exercising the power to
avoid the policy. It remains legally operative in the absence of an
affirmative act of avoidance. It has been definitely held that consid-
eration is not necessary even where no circumstances of estoppel exist.
7
A surety may waive a defense given him by the fact that his creditor
has given time to the principal debtor.8 A party may waive the defense
of the statute of limitations without consideration. 9 These are cases
of technical defenses which the law regards with disfavor, as it does
forfeitures in insurance.
In the instant case the court held that the insured was entitled to one
month of grace after the maturity of the note. This holding was based
on the fact that the statute specifically required a month of grace. But
the statute required a month of grace with interest, and the insured here
really had eight months of grace with interest. The note plainly speci-
fied that it was without grace. Where there is no such statute, the
courts are uniform in not adding the period of grace to the time
allowed by the-note.10 And under a similar statute the Michigan court
refused to add the statutory period to the time allowed. 1
It would seem that the court erred in holding that no forfeiture had
ever occurred and that, if it had, the company was either estopped to
show it or had waived the forfeiture.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS TO PHYSICIANS
In the famous trial of the Duchess of Kingston for bigamy,' Lord
Mansfield remarked that "if a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal . . .
secrets, to be sure he would be guilty of a breach of honor, and of great
indiscretion, but to give that information in a court of justice, which
by the law he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any indis-
cretion whatever." Although the latter part of this dictum has become
settled law,2 strangely enough the first part, if the great Chief Justice
meant to imply legal liability as attached to such a breach of confi-
T German In=. Co. v. Pitcher (i9o2) i6o Ind. 392, 64 N. E. 92x.
sHooper v. Pike (1897) 70 Minn. 84, 72 N. W. 829.
'Wood, Limitations (4th ed. 1916) sec. 68.
11 Lefler v. Nez York Life Ins. Co. (i9o6, C. C. A. 8th) 143 Fed. 814; Bank of
Commerce vu. New York Life Ins. Co. (i9o6) 125 Ga. 552, 54 S. E. 643.
' Schmedding v. Northern Assurance Co. (912) 170 Mich. 528, 136 N. W. 36.
Trial of the Duchess of Kingston (i776, H. L.) 2o How. St. Tr. 355, 573.
'At common law, information obtained while treating patients is not privileged
in the sense that a physician can not be compelled to testify to such communi-
cation or knowledge upon the witness stand. Wharton, Criminal Evidence (ioth
ed. 1912) sec. 516; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) sec. 247a; see (igoo) 64
JusTIcE oF THE PEAE, 241. But this rule has been changed by statute in a
majority of American Jurisdictions. 4o Cyc. 2381; 17 Am. St. Rep. 57o, note;
Greenleaf, op. cit.; Evans, Privileged Communications to Physicians (1894) 39
CENT. L. J. 114, has a collection of statutory provisions with full discussion.
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dence, had never been tested in an American court3 until the recent case
of Simonsen v. Swenson (1920, Neb.) 177 N. W. 831, which the court
declares "is a novel one. No cases bearing directly upon the question
have been cited by counsel, and our search has been unsuccessful."
The defendant physician had examined a boarding-house guest and
informed him that he was suffering from a highly contagious venereal
disease. The defendant requested the plaintiff to leave, telling him
of the danger of communicating the disease to others, and the latter
promised to do so. The physician, upon learning from the proprietor
that he was still there, informed the owner of the plaintiff's condition,
and the latter was forced to leave, although in fact he was not af-
flicted as the defendant had diagnosed.
The imputation of a contagious venereal disease is actionable per se
as slander;' but the case was not tried upon that theory, for both par-
ties apparently agreed that the defendant had adequate grounds for
his belief, acted without malice, and made only such disclosures as he
thought reasonable and proper under the circumstances. The plain-
tiff sued for a breach of "the duty of secrecy," citing a statute5 revoking
the license of any physician guilty of unprofessional conduct, an in-
stance of which is defined as "the betrayal of a professional secret to the
detriment of a patient."
Although the court with doubtful accuracy construed this statute as
creating a tort duty not to disclose such secrets, yet it held the cum-
munication to the owner privileged in the circumstances. The same
result, however, could more readily have been reached by common-law
principles, and Lord Mansfield might have been more directly vindi-
cated. The relationship of physician and patient is one arising out of a
consentual contract ;6 such a relationship manifestly implies an obliga-
tion of secrecy, and the disclosure of such confidences entails more than
a literal "breach of honour." To attempt to deny such a principle or
to set up its antithesis is perhaps the best means to make its necessity
apparent. "That a medical man, consulted in a matter of delicacy, of
which the disclosure may be most injurious to the feelings, and possi-
bly, the pecuniary interests of the party consulting, can gratuitously
and unnecessarily make it the subject of public communication, without
incurring any imputation beyond what is called a breach of honour,
and without the liability to a claim of redress in a court of law, is a
proposition to which, when thus broadly laid down, I think the court
will hardly give their countenance."7
As illustrated in the present case, there is a limit to this existing
'See L. R. A. 1917 C, 1131, note.
'Newell, Slander & Libel (3d ed. 1914) sec. 215, with authorities collected.
1913 Neb. Rev. St, sec. 2721.
'Bowers v. Santee (igig) 99 Ohio, 361, 124 N. E. 238; see 22 A. & E. Encyc.
790, 798.
"Lord Fullerton in A. B. v. C. D. (1851, Scotch Court of Sessions) 14 Ct.
of Sess. Cas. (2nd series) 177, 7 Scots Rev. Rep. 8oo, the only decision directly
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duty: to preserve silence is a duty owed to the individual, but only as a
member of society; and when absolute silence becomes detrimental to
the public welfare, the duty ceases. When the confidential relationship
of physician and patient discloses to the former a disease that will
necessarily be transmitted to others unless the danger of contagion is
made known to certain persons, public policy requires that there should
no longer be any duty of complete secrecy. The duty of non-disclosure
is then replaced by a legal privilege of giving information so far as this
may be necessary to prevent the spread of the disease.8 In respect to
certain duly constituted authorities, there may be even a legal duty of
making the disclosure."
INCORPORATION OF NATIONALIST CLUBS
The Catalonian Nationalist Club of New York applied to a justice
of the Supreme Court of New York for the approval of a certificate as
a membership corporation. The object of the corporation was to make
a center of representation of Catalonian culture and of the legitimate
national aspirations of Catalonia in America, to diffuse information, to
promote fellowship, and to unite with similar societies in this and other
nations. The justice refused to approve the certificate saying that it
had "been demonstrated in the recent past that the great need of the
time is the feaching of American culture" and that the declared purposes
of the corporation "if carried out to their ultimate completion, might
result detrimentally to the interests of the United States." Applica-
tion of Catalonia Nationalist Club of New York (192o, Sup. Ct.) 184
N. Y. Supp. 132.
The New York corporations law permits incorporation of a member-
ship corporation "for any lawful purpose" and requires the approval of
a justice of the supreme court before the certificate is filed with the
secretary of state.1 It has generally been held that in passing upon
such a certificate the officer or court acts in a ministerial and not in a
discretionary or judicial capacity. 2 In some jurisdictions a discretion-
in point, but apparently overlooked by counsel and the court in the instant case.
See Smith v. Driscoll (917) 94 Wash. 44i, 442, 162 Pac. 572 (cited in the present
decision) : "Neither is it necessary to pursue at length the inquiry of whether a
cause of action lies in favour of a patient against a physician for wrongfully
divulging confidential communications. For the purposes of what we shall
say it will be assumed that for so palpable a wrong the law provides a remedy."
But see NOTES (1920) 20 COL. L. Rav. 89o, where the contract element is not
discussed.
' See (1915) 79 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 3.
'Such as is created by statutes requiring the reporting of contagious diseases
to boards of health. See Hemenway, Public Health (914) secs. 32, 392- ff.,
410; 20 Halsbury, Laws of England, 338.
13 Cons. Laws of N. Y. I90o, 34o8.
'State ex rel. College of Bishops v. Vanderbilt University (1913) 129 Tenn.
279, 328, 164 S. W. 1151, 1x64; I Clark & Marshall, Private Corporations (i9o3)
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ary power has been expressly conferred by statute.3 It is always
found difficult to determine the line of distinction between ministerial
and discretionary or judicial acts. When the court or officer has to
determine whether or not there is an apparent attempt to evade a duty
imposed by law,4 whether the purpose of the corporation is business or
social,5 or whether the name is a proper one under the statute, he must
exercise a discretionary or judicial power. Such decisions are in many
cases subject to judicial review.
Where the purpose of a non-commercial corporation is manifestly
unlawful the certificate may be denied.7 Incorporation may also be
refused on grounds of public policy, a reason invoked when the corpo-
ration purposed to hold its meetings on Sunday ;s when a by-law for-
bade members to enlist in the Army or Navy of the United States ;9
and when the purposes of the corporation tended to increase divorce.'0
The fact that the corporation was not a "necessary" one and that the
name was not in the English language have been held insufficient rea-
sons for denying the certificate on such grounds." The cases are
numerous where certificates have been denied or charters suspended
because the corporations tended toward monopoly or restraint of trade
and consequently were against public policy.'
2
An analysis of the reasons stated seems to lead to some question
as to whether the discretionary power in this case was properly exer-
cised. The issue has been raised many times in the past and it yet
remains to be determined whether the fostering of affection or interest
in the native homes and early associations of our naturalized citizens is
detrimental to America, and whether the prohibition is not an attempt to
suppress one of the most natural instincts of civilized man.
Reference was recently made in these columns to the case of Town
of Windsor v. Whitney et al. (192o, Conn.) iii Atl. 354.' We stated
that the court upheld the constitutionality of Rev. Stat. 1918, secs. 391-
395, which provide for the establishment of building lines by a commis-
"Beach v. McKay (1917) io8 Tex. 224, 191 S. W. 557.
'People ex rel. Barney v. Whalen (1907 Sup. Ct.) 56 Misc. Rep. 278, io6 N. Y.
Supp. 434.
'People ex rel. Davenport v. Rice (1893, Sup. Ct.) 68 Hun, 24, 22 N. Y.
Supp. 631; People ex rel. Bonnie a Rose (igoo) i88 II1. 268, 59 N. E. 432.
'People ex rel. Felter v. Rose (1907) 225 IIL 496, 8o N. E. 293.
'Hanger v. Commonwealth (i9o8) lO7 Va. 872, 6o S. E. 67.
'In -re Agudath Hakehiloth (1896, Sup. Ct.) 18 Misc. Rep. 717, 42 N. Y.
Supp. 985.
*In re Charter Mulholland Benevolent Society (1873, Pa. D. C.) io Phila. ig.
loIn re Helping Hand Marriage Association (1881, Pa. D. C.) I5 Phila. 644.
'In re Deutsch-Amerikanischer Volksfest-Verein (19Ol) 2oo Pa. 143, 49 AtI.
949.
I Fletcher, Cyc. Corporations (1917) 179 and cases collected in the notes.
'See COMMENTS (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 171, 174.
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sion on town plan. Our attention has been called to the fact that the
validity of this statute was not directly in issue in this case, but rather
the constitutionality of a special act of the general assembly creating a
commission on town plan for the town plan of Windsor.2 This act dif-
fers from the one first mentioned in that it provides for no compensa-
tion. Chief Justice Wheeler, writing the majority opinion, sustains the
validity of the special act as a regulation of the use of land under the
police power. This case even goes further than necessary to uphold
the general statute."
Justice Gager, in a strong dissenting opinion, argues that "this is a
taking of property without compensation. Calling what in fact is an
exercise of the right of eminent domain an exercise of the police power,
does not avoid the constitutional question."'4  He seems as anxious to
hold that a building restriction is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain as the majority is to find it a valid exercise of the police power.
The real issue is best stated by Justice Gager in the following words:
"Whether there is benefit or damage is, as to a given lot, a question offact to be determined by a proper tribunal, in which the property owner
is given a chance to be heard; it is not a question of law to be deter-
mined according as to whether you call the act, which is at all times
one and the same, an exercise of the police power or of the right of
eminent domain."
In the final analysis the question is not one of terms used, but the
broad question of public policy, whether property should be held sub-
ject to regulations that may be placed upon it for the benefit of society
or whether there must be a payment of compensation whenever prop-
erty rights seem to be invaded. The courts are upholding regula-
tions placed upon land when no compensation is provided, sustaining
them wheti necessary as a valid exercise of the police power. Many
of our "inherent" rights still "inhere," but not in their former robust
proportions and Connecticut in the instant case has gone further than
many of her sister states.
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in People, ex rel.
Mulkins, v. Jimerson (Oct. 5, 1920) 64 N. Y. L. J. 545, presents a
'Special Laws 1917, at p. 827.
"The court is careful to place the decision squarely upon grounds of publichealth, safety, or morals. Upon the "aesthetic purpose" issue, the instant case
is not inconsistent with the case of Farist Steel Co. v. Bridgrport (i89i) 6o
Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 561. That case held that the establishment of a harbor line
constituted a taking of property which could not be permitted, even with
conpensation, unless for a public use, and .that a purely aesthetic purpose was
not a public use. Under the authority of the instant case, however, it would
seem that the establishment of this harbor line might now be sustained under the
police power.
' See St. Louis v. Hill (1893) 116 Mo. 527, 2 S. W. 861; Matter of Clinton
Ave. (ioI) 57 App. Div. i66, 68 N. Y. Supp. i96.
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modern illustration of medimval conditions when law was personal
and tribal, instead of "common," and each man's legal relations were
determined by the law of his particular tribe, even though he lived in
the midst of other peoples subject to different law. Living within the
limits of the state of New York are five Indian tribes, known as the
Onondaga, Seneca, Tuscarora, Saint Regis, and Shinnecock tribes.
Statutes for their government, passed from the year 1797 down to the
present time, now appear as chapter 26 of the Consolidated Laws of
New York. By these statutes a special tribal court, known as the
Peacemakers' Court, is established with jurisdiction over all contro-
versies between Indians, "whether arising upon contracts or for wrongs
and particularly for any encroachments or trespass on any land," and
with "exclusive jurisdiction to grant divorces between Indians" and to
determine questions of title to land. An appeal lies to the Council of
the tribe. Action having been brought in the Peacemakers' Court of
the Seneca nation against the relator to recover possession of land, she
applied to the Supreme Court of New York for a writ of prohibition
without making any appearance in the Peacemakers' Court. It is by
this writ that inferior courts are restrained from exceeding their juris-
diction, and it was by using the writ freely that Lord Chief Justice
Coke was able to kill the court of small claims, called the Court of
Requests, to limit the jurisdiction of the admiralty and the ecclesiastical
courts, and thus to concentrate judicial power in the King's courts.
The Court of Appeals does not decide whether the Supreme Court is a
superior court to the Peacemakers' Court with authority to prohibit
action by the latter,' but refuses the writ on the ground that it must be
assumed that the Peacemakers' Court will keep within its jurisdiction.
"A writ of prohibition will not be granted in anticipation of erroneous
rulings by a court of limited jurisdiction on jurisdictional questions."
It would appear that under the statutory constitution of these Indian
nations in New York, the Peacemakers' Court may, as to all matters
specified, recognize all tribal rules and customs and by judicial de-
cisions enact them into law. The common law of New York is not
the common law of the Seneca Indian nation.
The old question as to the jurisdiction of a court to try a case involv-
ing title to reil property in another state has arisen again in the case
of Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co. (1920, Me.)
io Atl. 429. The defendant and the plaintiff were both Maine cor-
'The Appellate Division has held that the Supreme Court is not such a
superior court and has no authority to issue writs of prohibition to the Peace-
makers' Court. People, ex rel. Jimerson, v. Shongo (1913) 83 Misc. 325, affd.
(I914) 164 App. Div. 9o8. The Indians "are not governed by our laws, and their
courts are not inferior courts to our courts, but are courts of a foreign juris-
diction."
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porations. Through its own shafts in Arizona the defendant removed
certain ores which were the property of, and in the possession of the
plaintiff. The court properly took jurisdiction and allowed the plain-
tiff to recover. Where the gist of the action is a tortious injury to
land in one state, the courts of another will not take jurisdiction, on
the ground that such an issue is exclusively local in character.' If the
question of title is only collaterally in issue, as in the adjudication of
contractual rights incidentally involving title to land, or one involv-
ing severance of chattels from the realty and conversion, a foreign
court will take jurisdiction.2
The case of The Porto Alexandre [1920, C. A.] P. 3o, decided that
a public ship of a foreign state is exempt from process of English
courts, although it is being used in an ordinary commercial transac-
tion. The same rule has been established in the United States
courts.' The foundation on which this doctrine rests is that a pub-
lic vessel is a manifestation of the sovereignty of an independent
foreign state, and must be respected as the person of the sovereign
would be.2  Ships under the control of the United States Shipping
Board are by statute specifically made subject to the laws governing
ordinary merchant vessels.
The recent case of Stanton v. Southwick (1920, K. B.) 123 L. T.
651, raises an interesting point in Verminal Jurisprudence. The rats
in the case were mere trespassers, and not licensees, and the court held
them to be ferae naturae-very unlike bugs, which are part of the
premises. Hence unless a rat were legally domiciled in one's resi-
dence, his presence is no breach of warranty to the tenant, who has a
privilege to eject him at the rodent's own risk. No recovery was
allowed since the rats in the case were total strangers to the defendant.
Caveant muridae.
'See (i9r6) 16 CoL L. REv. 323.
'See (i911) 11 CoL. L. REv. 262; 34 L R. A. (N.s.) 994, note.
'The Maipo (1918, S. D. N. Y.) 252 Fed. 627, (i918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
187.
2The Parlement Beige (1878, C. A.) L. R. 5 P. 197.
'U. S. Comp. St. I918, sec. 8146e.
